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We apply an indirect method to test for the extent of loss leader pricing.   Specifically, 
the extent of loss leader pricing should increase with the profit from other regularly-
priced items (“loss leader scope”).   Bookstores customarily use bestsellers as loss 
leaders.  Among conventional bookstores, we found that the bestseller discount 
systematically increased with the store area, selection of titles, and presence of other 
product categories.  A one standard deviation increase in store area was associated 
with a 3.7 (± 1.8) higher bestseller percentage discount.  Among online stores, we 
found that the bestseller discount systematically increased with the selection of titles 
and number of product categories.  A one standard deviation increase in selection 
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1.  Introduction 
 
When and how retailers should use loss-leaders has been the subject of considerable 
theoretical research.  Considerations that have been identified include the distinction 
between “shopping goods” and “impulse goods” (Hess and Gerstner 1987), price 
advertising as a commitment to assure buyers of surplus (Lal and Matutes 1994), 
differences in buyer loyalties (Simester 1997), and differences in the buyers’ intended 
basket of purchases (DeGraba 2003). 
 
  However, owing to the lack of information on retail costs, there has been little 
empirical research into the use and extent of loss leaders (Chevalier et al. 2003).  
From weekly price promotions at two supermarkets, Walters and McKenzie (1988) 
concluded that loss leaders do not affect store profit and have little impact on store 
traffic.  Chevalier et al. (2003) found that a Chicago-area supermarket systematically 
reduced margins at seasonal demand peaks, which behavior was consistent with the 
use of loss leaders but not other explanations of counter-cyclical pricing.    
 
  In this paper, we apply an indirect method to test for the use and extent of loss 
leaders.   Specifically, a retailer’s return from a loss leader is the profit contribution 
from customers’ expected purchases of regular-priced items.   The expected 
purchases depend on characteristics of the customers and store-level factors that we 
call the “loss leader scope”.   Accordingly, the extent of loss leader pricing should 
increase with the loss leader scope.  
 
  We applied this indirect method to the pricing of books in both conventional 
and online stores.  For conventional stores, we measured loss leader scope by the area 
of the store, selection of titles, and presence of other product categories such as 
music and videos.  With all three measures, we found strong support for the 
hypothesis that the extent of loss leader pricing increased with the loss leader scope.   
 
  For online stores, we measured the loss leader scope by the selection of titles 
and number of other product categories.  We found strong support for the 
hypothesis with loss leader scope measured by selection of titles and marginal 
support with the scope measured by the number of other product categories.  © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  3
2.   Model 
 
Suppose that all consumers are identical and have demand for at most one unit each 
of a broad class of items.  For simplicity, the consumer’s reservation value for each of 
the items is v.  Consider a retailer selling one loss-leader item and a selection s of 
other items under conditions of monopolistic competition.  Following Hess and 
Gerstner (1988) and Lal and Matutes (1994), we suppose that the retailer sets price p 
< v for the loss-leader item and prices the other s items at the consumer’s reservation 
value v.  Let mQ(p) represent the number of consumers at price p, where m represents 
idiosyncratic factors specific to the retail location.  Further, let the retailer incur a 
fixed cost F of retailing and a constant marginal cost c for all items. 
 
The sequence of decisions is that the retailer first chooses the selection s to 
offer, then, given s, chooses the price p.  At the pricing stage, the retailer’s profit is 
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which characterizes the price, p(s). 
 
Condition (2) is the textbook profit-maximization condition under conditions 
of monopolist competition with the adjustment 
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for the impact of the loss leader on the profit from selling the other items.  If s is 
higher, this adjustment factor will be more negative, and hence, by (2), the profit-
maximizing price p will be lower.   Describing s as the “loss leader scope”, we have the 
theoretical proposition that the price of the loss leader is decreasing in the loss leader 
scope.   © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  4
3.  Hypotheses and Data 
 
We test our theoretical proposition with data from the retailing of books.  Books 
differ from many other goods in that they are marked with a list price at the point of 
manufacture.  Bookstores set prices not in absolute dollar terms, but rather in terms 
of discounts from list price.   In common with other retailers, bookstores engage in a 
variety of pricing strategies, including loyalty programs, coupons, and clearance sales.   
 
Bookstores stand out from other retailers in one respect.  They systematically 
charge lower prices for their most popular items.  Specifically, bookstores offer larger 
discounts on current bestsellers than titles not on the bestseller list.  For instance, 
Barnes & Noble sets a 30% discount on all hardcover and paperback titles on its 
bestseller list, 20% discount on selected featured titles, and no discount on most 
other titles (Barnes & Noble 2002).   
 
On first impression, it seems odd for a bookstore to offer larger discounts for 
bestsellers than other titles.  Since bestsellers are in the hottest demand, bookstores 
should be able to extract relatively higher margins.  In conventional microeconomic 
models of both perfect competition and monopoly, when demand is higher, the price 
will be higher.1  One possible rationalization is that retailers use bestsellers as loss 
leaders.  Steve Riggio, then Vice Chairman of Barnes & Noble.com once remarked: 
“best sellers, which make up only 3% of sales, have long been treated as loss 
leaders”.2 3  
 
During the week of August 3, 2003, we engaged surveyors to report the 
pricing of eight titles and store attributes at bookstores in four areas – around two 
East and West Coast campuses.   We asked each surveyor to survey any ten 
bookstores in their area.  After eliminating duplicate outlets of chain stores, we had 
22 unique stores. 
 
                                            
1  The practice of discounting bestsellers also contradicts the general retail policy of managing 
uncertain demand by setting a high initial price and marking down if demand turns out to be low 
(Lazear 1986; Pashigian and Bowen 1991; and Png 1991). 
2  “Web Booksellers Give Potter Fans Rush Delivery”, Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2000. 
3  In the DVD market, retailers systematically discount bestsellers more heavily than other titles 
(Tang and Xing 2000, Table 4-2). © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  5
The eight titles consisted of four bestsellers and four non-bestsellers.  The 
four bestsellers comprised the top two titles in the Sunday, August 3, 2003 New York 
Times hardcover fiction and paperback fiction bestseller lists.  To represent titles that 
were not bestsellers, the other four titles consisted of the top two titles in the same 
headings for the week of August 4, 2002, excluding those titles that were among the 
August 3, 2003 bestsellers.   
 
In the case of a conventional bookstore, the extent to which a customer 
attracted by a loss leader might buy other items depends on the availability and 
selection of the other items.  Hence, appropriate measures of loss leader scope would 
be store area and selection of titles, and also the presence of other product categories.   
The surveyors recorded, for each store, the estimated store area (Area), the number 
of titles in stock (Selection), and the presence of other product categories 
(Other_Cat). 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample. The discount rates ranged 
from 0% to 42% with a mean of 9.4% (±13.4%).4  The average store area was 8577 
square feet (±12,330 square feet) and the average selection of titles was 114,023 
(±181,770).5  The surveyors also recorded whether the store was located in a 
shopping mall (Mall), and whether the store had a visible competitor (Competitor).  
 
During the same week of August 3, 2003, we visited 11 online bookstores to 
record the pricing of the same eight titles, and various retailer attributes.  These were 
identified from Clay et al.’s (2001) list of “wide selection” online booksellers and after 
eliminating stores that had ceased operations.  In the case of an online bookstore, the 
loss leader scope could be measured by the selection of titles and the number of 
other product categories, such as music and videos.  
 
Absent direct information on the stores’ selection of titles, we built an index 
by the following procedure.  First, we constructed a random sample of book titles by 
randomly generating 10 digit numbers in ISBN (International Standard Book 
                                            
4 Number in parentheses is the standard deviation. 
5 For the chain stores – Barnes & Noble, B. Dalton (which belongs to Barnes & Noble, Inc.), 
Borders, and Waldenbooks (which belongs to Borders, Inc.), we used the average of the discounts 
observed by our surveyors over the outlets of the chain surveyed, and the chain-wide average store 
area and title stock, as reported in the respective 2002 corporate annual reports.   © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  6
Number) format, and then discarding those were not listed by bookfind-online.com 
as representing an actual title.  We repeated the procedure until we had accumulated 
1000 titles.  Next, for each online store, we checked the availability of these titles to 
derive its selection of titles (Selection_Total), as measured as out of 1000.  We also 
constructed a narrower index of titles available for delivery within five working days 
(Selection_Onhand).   
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the sample.  The average discount rate 
among the online stores was 17.6% (±15.1%), which was higher than that among the 
conventional stores.  On the broader measure, Selection_Total, the average selection 
of titles was 322.7 (±264.4), while on the narrower measure, Selection_Onhand, the 
average selection was 208.6 (±224.0).6  We also recorded whether the online store was 
related to a conventional store, as previous research into the retail pricing of DVDs 
has suggested that online affiliates of conventional stores price higher than pure 
online stores (Tang and Xing 2001). 
 
Accordingly, we operationalized our tests as follows.    
 
Hypothesis 1.  Among conventional stores, the discount on bestsellers is increasing 
in  
(i)  the area of the store, 
(ii)  the selection of titles, and 
(iii)  the presence of other product categories. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Among online stores, the discount on bestsellers is increasing in 
(i)  the selection of titles, and  
(ii)  the number of product categories. 
 
                                            
6  Data on page views from Trafficranking.com provided independent validation of our selection 
measures: the correlation between Selection_Total and page views per visit was 0.739, while the 
correlation between Selection_Onhand and page views per visit was 0.940. © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  7
4.  Empirical Results 
 
We tested the hypotheses using least-squares regression with White’s (1980) 
adjustment of standard errors and covariance for heteroskedasticity.  In all 
regressions, the dependent variable was the discount from the list price and the 
explanatory variables included indicators for hardcover titles and bestsellers to reflect 
industry pricing practices.   Generally, the pricing of hardcover titles differs from 
paperbacks, and bestsellers are subject to discount.  
 
For conventional stores, besides the variable to operationalize the empirical 
test, we also included the store area and presence of other product categories as 
explanatory variables to capture economies of scale and scope respectively.    
 
Table 3 reports the results.  Referring to column (a), the coefficient of 
Hardcover was positive and significant.   The coefficient of store area was negative 
and significant, which is not consistent with economies of scale.  The coefficient of 
the presence of other product categories was positive and significant, which is 
consistent with economies of scope. 
 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of the compound variable, 
Bestseller*Area, was positive and significant.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1(i) that the 
extent of loss leader pricing increases with the loss leader scope, larger stores 
systematically offered bigger discounts on bestsellers.   Specifically, a store that was 
larger by one standard deviation offered a 3.7 (±1.8) higher bestseller percentage 
discount.  This seems very reasonable relative to the mean 9.4% (±13.4) percentage 
discount in our sample. 
 
  An alternative measure of loss leader scope is the selection of titles.  However, 
we were able to collect data on selection for relatively fewer stores.   Table 3, column 
(b), reports the regression with loss leader scope measured by the selection.  The 
results were quite similar to those with loss leader scope measured by store area.  
While the coefficient of Selection itself was negative but not significant, the 
coefficient of the compound variable, Bestseller*Selection, was positive and 
significant, which was consistent with Hypothesis 1(ii).   A store with a one standard 
deviation larger selection offered a 18.3 (±9.7) higher bestseller percentage discount. © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  8
 
  Yet another measure of loss leader scope is whether the store also retails other 
product categories.   Table 3, column (c), reports the regression with loss leader scope 
measured by the presence of other product categories.  The results were quite similar 
to those with loss leader scope measured by store area.  While the coefficient of 
Other_Cat itself was positive but not significant, the coefficient of the compound 
variable, Bestseller*Other_Cat, was positive and significant, which was consistent 
with Hypothesis 1(iii).  A store that carried other categories offered a 10.3 (±3.4) 
higher bestseller percentage discount. 
    
One possible reason why retailers discount bestsellers is that the wholesale 
cost of bestsellers to retailers is lower.   However, this would not explain why the 
depth of the discount increases with the store area, selection of titles, or presence of 
other categories.   
 
A variant of this explanation emphasizes that bookstores benefit from volume 
discounts.  To the extent that the sales volume of bestsellers is correlated with store 
area, then the discount on bestsellers should increase with store area and selection.   
However, if bookstores with larger area benefited from volume discounts, these 
should be reflected in the pricing of all titles, not just bestsellers.   In our regression, 
the coefficient of store area was negative.  Further, volume discounts would not 
explain why the depth of the bestseller discount increases with the presence of other 
categories.    
 
In addition, the volume discount explanation is not consistent with the pricing 
strategies of the Barnes & Noble and Borders groups.  In each group, the large-
format stores (Barnes & Noble and Borders) offer deeper and wider bestseller 
discounts than their smaller-format affiliates (B. Dalton and Waldenbooks 
respectively).  By contrast, the volume discount explanation would predict that stores 
within the same group should set the same price discounts. 
 
Finally, we also checked the impact of retail complementarity and competition 
on pricing.  Mall bookstores benefit from the presence of anchor stores and may 
price differently from stand-alone bookstores that must draw their own traffic 
(Pashigian and Gould 1998).  Table 3, column (d), reports a regression with additional © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  9
variables identifying stores located in malls (Mall) and stores from which another 
bookstore was visible (Competitor).  In our regression, the coefficient for mall 
bookstores was positive but not significant.  The coefficient for competition was 




Next, we tested Hypothesis 2 for online stores.  As reported in Table 4, the results 
were similar to those for conventional stores.  Column (a) reports the regression with 
the loss leader scope measured by the selection of titles.  The coefficient of 
Hardcover was positive and significant, showing that online booksellers followed 
industry practice of discounting hard cover titles.  The coefficient of Selection_Total 
was negative and significant, which suggested that larger stores exercised some degree 
of market power.  The coefficient of Categories was positive and significant, 
suggesting that the presence of significant scope economies.   
 
The coefficient of the compound variable, Bestseller*Selection_Total was 
positive and significant.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2(i) that the extent of loss leader 
pricing increases with the loss leader scope, stores with a broader selection of titles 
systematically offered bigger discounts on bestsellers.   A store with one standard 
deviation larger total selection offered a 9.7 (±2.2) higher bestseller percentage 
discount. 
 
Table 4, column (b) reports the regression with loss leader scope measured by 
the selection of titles deliverable within five days.  The results were very close to 
those with loss leader scope measured by the total selection of titles.  In particular, 
the coefficient of the compound variable, Bestseller*Selection_Onhand was positive 
and significant, which was consistent with Hypothesis 2(i).  A store with one standard 
deviation larger selection on hand offered a 6.5 (±2.1) higher bestseller percentage 
discount. 
 
Using data from Trafficranking.com, we found a high degree of correlation 
between page views per visit and our selection measures: the correlation with 
Selection_Total was 0.739, while that with Selection_Onhand was 0.940.  The © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  10
number of pages a customer views during each visit directly measures browsing and 
the extent to which they might buy regular-priced items. 
 
Table 4, column (c) reports the regression with loss leader scope measured by 
the number of product categories (Categories).  The results were similar to those with 
loss leader scope measured by the selection of titles.  The coefficient of the 
compound variable, Bestseller*Categories was positive and significant, which was 
consistent with Hypothesis 2(ii).  A store with one standard deviation more product 
categories offered a 3.9 (±2.2) higher bestseller percentage discount. 
 
  Table 4, column (d) reports the regression with an indicator variable, 
Conventional_Affiliates.  The coefficient was negative, suggesting that online 
affiliates of conventional stores did indeed offer lower discounts than pure online 
stores, which is consistent with the previous research into DVD retailing (Tang and 
Xing 2001).  However, the coefficient was quite small (-0.2162) and not significant.  
Two possible explanations are that the pricing strategies of conventional stores’ 
online affiliates and pure online stores have converged since the dot.com boom, and 
that the pricing of books differs from that of DVDs.     © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  11
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have focused on testing the presence of loss leader pricing, which is just one case 
of the more general issue of counter-cyclical pricing (Warner and Barsky 1995; 
McDonald 2000; Chevalier et al. 2003).  Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) offer three 
other possible reasons why prices might rise when demand peaks: (a) high demand 
items have lower search costs; (b) high demand products have lower fixed supply 
costs; (c) tacit collusion.  None of these three explanations would account for the 
correlation between price discounts and measures such as store area, titles in stock, 
and presence or number of other product categories.   Accordingly, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that bookstores use bestsellers as loss leaders.  
 
  Besides store-level attributes, the effectiveness of loss leader pricing also 
depends on level of the consumer’s switching costs.  If a consumer could easily move 
from one store to another, then she could buy a cheap bestseller at one and then 
travel elsewhere to buy other items.  In that case, she would not be locked in to the 
store offering the loss leader.  An intriguing direction for future work is to compare 
the extent of loss leader pricing in online and conventional channels.  If buyer 
switching costs are lower in online channels, then the use of loss leaders should also 
be lower.   The challenge would be to construct a measure of loss leader scope that 
could be applied to both channels.  
 
 © 2004 Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png  12
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Table 1:  Conventional Bookstores  
 
Variable Unit  Min  Mean  Max  Std  deviation 
Discount* Percent  0  9.40  42.00  13.40 
Hardcover   Indicator  0  0.5  1  0.50 
Bestseller   Indicator  0  0.5  1  0.50 
Area#  ‘000 sq. feet  0.30  8.58  45  12.33 
Selection#   ‘000  10.00  114.02  700.00 181.77 
Mall   Indicator  0  0.19  1  0.39 
Competitor   Indicator  0  0.11  1  0.31 
Other_Cat   Indicator  0  0.59  1  0.49 
 
* For the chain stores – Barnes & Noble, B. Dalton (which belongs to Barnes & Noble, Inc.), 
Borders, and Waldenbooks (which belongs to Borders, Inc.), the discounts were the average 
of the discounts observed by our surveyors over the outlets of the chain surveyed. 
 
# For the chain stores, we used the chain-wide average store area and title selection, as 
reported in the respective 2002 corporate annual reports.  For other stores, the store area 




Table 2:  Online Bookstores  
 
Variable Unit  Min  Mean  Max  Std  deviation 
Discount Percent  0  17.60  46.00  15.13 
Hardcover   Indicator  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Bestseller   Indicator  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Selection_Total Of  1000  65  322.7 846 264.4 
Selection_Onhand Of 1000  30  208.6  688  224.0 
Categories     1  6.36  31  8.86 
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Table 3:  Conventional Store Discounts 
 
















































- -  0.2766* 
(0.1461) 
Bestseller*Selection -  0.1008** 
(0.0532) 
- - 
Bestseller*Other_Cat -  -  10.2677*** 
(3.3824) 
- 
Mall   - -  - 1.3547 
(2.0972) 
Competitor  -  -  - 7.7433*** 
(2.6527) 
No. of observations  128  80  128  128 
Adjusted R2 0.4396  0.4293  0.4606 0.4665 
F-statistic 20.9241  10.9029 22.6926  16.8625 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at the 90% level 
** Significant at the 95% level 
*** Significant at the 99% level 
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Table 4:  Online Store Discounts 
 





















































Bestseller*Categories -  -  0.4406* 
(0.2492) 
- 
Conventional_Affiliate -  -  - -0.2162 
(3.8788) 
No. of observations  87  87  87  87 
Adjusted R2 0.3636  0.3100  0.2834 0.3557 
F-statistic 10.8286  8.7282 7.8037  8.9135 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at the 90% level 
** Significant at the 95% level 
*** Significant at the 99% level 
 
 
  
 